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1. Introduction 
 
Many financial markets are fragmented.  At a basic level many markets are fragmented 
according to the characteristics of the traders involved.  Thus, we commonly observe 
markets with wholesale (broker to broker, B2B) and retail segments (broker to customer, 
B2C) that have well defined rules separating activity in each space.  Fragmentation 
within the wholesale segment usually occurs for different reasons to those relevant to the 
wholesale-retail split.  Information asymmetry and transparency play important roles in 
the segmentation of wholesale financial markets.  In the case of high sensitivity to the 
presence of large incipient trades it is well known that fragmentation can often become 
extreme, resulting in completely opaque transactions between pairs of agents.  But do 
minor differences in trader characteristics and information asymmetry matter for the 
location of price discovery where trading remains post-trade transparent? We find 
significant differences in the location and speed of price discovery in the case of the inter-
dealer market in US Treasury Securities.  This is probably the largest and most liquid 
wholesale financial market in the world (excluding foreign exchange markets) and yet it 
is almost equally divided between two electronic trading platforms that are very similar in 
terms of their liquidity and transparency.  It is, at present unknown as to which of the two 
segments is the most important source of ‘price discovery’.  It is also not clear what 
additional costs are incurred by trading in the less efficient segment.   
 
The present study attempts to uncover the effects of mild differences in pre-trade 
transparency and liquidity to answer these questions. We examine the location of ‘price 
discovery’ and the differential trading costs across this important, almost homogeneous, 
market. Specifically, we use very high frequency synchronized microstructure data from 
the eSpeed and BrokerTec markets. BrokerTec is more active in the trading of 2-, 5-, and 
10-year T-notes than eSpeed, which has more active trading for 30-year bonds. The two 
main electronic trading platforms also have slight differences in their ‘pre-trade’ 
transparency.  The eSpeed platform is more pre-trade transparent than the BrokerTec 
platform.  We find that BrokerTec produces a lower bid-ask spread on average than 
eSpeed.  Our findings are also in line with the experimental results of Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999, 2000) about the location of price discovery in the less transparent 
platform.  More price discovery takes place in the less transparent market (BrokerTec). 
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This platform more frequently possesses a more efficient price.  Both of the markets 
share the same long-run driving dynamic and price adjustment away from disequilibrium 
between the two markets is mostly located in the movement of prices on the more 
transparent eSpeed platform.  Overall, the size of the price adjustment (‘error correction’) 
on eSpeed is larger than on BrokerTec.   However, the adjustment coefficient on the more 
transparent platform is only accurately estimated if the empirical analysis is general 
enough to control for adjustment to bid-ask spread disequilibrium as well as cross-
platform disequilibrium.   
 
We find that the evidence in support of price discovery on BrokerTec has been changing 
over time and it does not apply equally across all maturities.  Where eSpeed has a 
liquidity advantage in the longer maturities it also accounts for more of the price 
discovery and less of the adjustment to disequilibrium.  Overall the differences in the cost 
of trading in the alternative trading platforms are not large. In the absence of a significant 
cost differential between the two platforms we suggest that the main benefit to larger 
participants of maintaining a presence on both markets is as a protection against the risks 
of market outages due to technical catastrophes.  The small risk of such a costly event 
seems to be just enough to keep the market fragmented.  Another possible reason is the 
presence of large costs of changing allegiance from one platform to another for the 
smaller participants.  
 
Most of the extant literature examines only one or other of the two main trading 
platforms.  As far as we know, there are no papers that employ synchronized event-by-
event data from these two major platforms.  Fragmentation and price discovery is 
examined by Biais (1993), and the case of dual platforms with differential transparency 
has been analyzed theoretically and experimentally in Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999 and 
2000).  Our analysis is an important step in the process of evidencing the findings of the 
theoretical assertions already made in this theoretical and experimental literature.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
introduces the development of US Treasury market electronic trading platforms and the 
sample data set. The methodology is developed in Section 4. Section 5 reports the 
empirical results. Section 6 provides conclusions and implications of the paper.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The extant theoretical literature on market transparency finds that the level of 
transparency and the relative transparency of market segments has significant effects on 
market quality (including liquidity, trading costs, and price discovery). A wide variety of 
studies considers the merits of different trading mechanisms
2
 and relates these to liquidity 
and transparency characteristics - and in particular to those studied by Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (2000).  More literature can be found in O’Hara (1995), Hasbrouck (2007) and 
De Jong and Rindi (2009). Here we present a selective review focusing on market 
transparency, price discovery and the literature of relevance to the US treasury market. 
  
Biais (1993) shows that quotation transparency is likely to increase market efficiency and 
improve liquidity. Pagano and Roell (1996) argue that greater transparency enhances 
market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for dealers to take advantage of relatively 
uninformed participants. Moreover, they suggest that increasing transparency will mainly 
reduce the average trading costs of uninformed traders.  
 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) use a laboratory experiment to investigate effects on 
market equilibrium under different degrees of market transparency. They suggest that 
transparency significantly increases the informational efficiency of market price but 
widens the bid-ask spreads. In a transparent market, the mid-point of bid and ask 
converges to intrinsic value more quickly. These results are consistent with the finding of 
Pagano and Roell (1996). They also show that spreads increase in more transparent 
conditions. Moreover, they find that the degree of market transparency has important 
effects on market equilibrium. 
 
Of most relevance to the current study, Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) examine whether 
a transparent market segment would survive when faced with direct competition from a 
less transparent one for the same asset. They focus on the growing regulatory and market 
concern with market fragmentation.  Their concern is that the ability to hide trades in less 
transparent parallel segments undermines the attractiveness of established markets, and 
                                                 
2
 For example, Seppi (1997) finds that small and large investors prefer a hybrid specialist/limit order 
market, while mid-sized investors prefer pure limit order markets. 
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thereby reduces their crucial role in price discovery. They design two laboratory 
experiments which involve multiple dealers operating in two market segments with 
different degrees of transparency. They use a game theoretic approach to model dealer 
behavior in this context. They find that differential transparency has significant effects on 
market behaviour. Low-transparency dealers have better performance than transparent 
participants; they offer lower spreads and capture more of the order flow.  Low-
transparency dealers set prices more efficiently and they have more opportunities to set 
and trade at inside spreads. They make a profit from using their information advantage, 
while dealers in the more transparent segment make a loss. They also suggest that dealers 
would endogenously choose to trade in the less transparent market and eventually give 
rise to the demise of the transparent segment. These findings support the fears of dealers 
regarding the increasing fragmentation of some markets including the rise of dark pool 
crossing networks.
3
 Other experimental studies include Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and 
Mahieu (1999) and Flood, Koedijk, Dijk and Leeuwen (2002). 
 
There are many related studies on effects of transparency. Baruch’s (2005) theoretical 
model shows that an increase in transparency reduces liquidity providers’ market power 
and greater transparency leads to more informative prices. Bessembinder, Maxwell and 
Venkataraman (2005) find that trading costs were reduced for large institutional traders 
following the introduction of TRACE.  The above literature appears to favor increased 
transparency from a market efficiency and investor protection point of view.  However, 
there are contributions to the literature that questions this conclusion. Madhaven (1996) 
found trade disclosure increased the costs of trading for large traders. Madhavan, Porter 
and Weaver (2005) find that greater transparency reduced market liquidity and led to a 
reduction of market depth.  Other studies in this vein that focus on equity markets 
include, Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003), Boehmer (2004) and Aitken et al. 
(2006). Drudi and Massa (2002) investigate how dealers behave in parallel markets with 
differential transparency for the same Italian sovereign bonds and they find that informed 
dealers may refrain from trading in the more transparent market in order to benefit from 
their informational advantage in the less transparent market. Alternatively, informed 
                                                 
3
 Anecdotal evidence of this effect is often brought into discussions with market regulators.  An example is 
concerns the effects of the cross-listing of French shares on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  Dealers on 
the Paris Bourse invariably report a loss of trading volume and liquidity provision in Paris reflecting the 
greater relative opacity of the LSE.  
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traders may use the more transparent market to influence price. They also suggest that the 
less transparent market improves the liquidity of the more transparent market. In this 
respect, their results are consistent with the findings of Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000).  
Other event studies include Bortoli, Jarnecic and Johnstone (2006), Boehmer, Saar and 
Yu (2005) and Scalia and Vacca (1999). 
  
As far as the US Treasury market is concerned. Brandt and Kavajecz (2002) find that in 
the absence of material public information events, order flow imbalances account for a 
substantial portion of the day-to-day fluctuations of the yield curve and the role of the 
order flow depends crucially on the liquidity of the Treasury market. Dunne, Moore and 
Portes (2006) examine a transparency change which occurred in June 2003 on the US 
Treasury market. They find that effective spreads increase as a result of a small increase 
in transparency of the eSpeed platform. They conclude that differential market 
transparency adversely affects the risks borne by dealers.  As a result this can adversely 
affect market liquidity. Mizrach and Neely (2008) highlight the role of the futures 
markets in price discovery of US Treasury market. Fleming and Mizrach (2009) assess 
the microstructure of US treasury market using data from the BrokerTec trading platform. 
They find that market liquidity is greater than that found in earlier studies that use data 
only from voice-assisted brokers. They also found that the price effect of trade on 
BrokerTec is quite small and is even smaller once orderbook information is considered. 
Also using the intraday data from the BrokerTec electronic trading platform, Jiang, Lo 
and Verdelhan (2011) identify jumps in U.S. T-bond prices and investigate what causes 
such unexpected large price changes. They examine the relative importance of 
macroeconomic news announcements versus liquidity shocks in explaining the observed 
jumps. In addition, they examine the informativeness of order flow immediately after 
bond price jumps. 
 
In the literature of price discovery in market microstructure models, there are two 
competing approaches to estimating the parameters of price discovery in cointegrated 
time series: the information shares as defined in Hasbrouck (1995) and the permanent-
transitory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995), applied in the market 
microstructure literature by e.g. Booth, So and Tse (1999), Baillie et al. (2002), Harris et 
al. (2002). These two models complement each other and provide different views of the 
price discovery process between markets. The Hasbrouck model considers each market’s 
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contribution to the variance of the innovations to the common factor, while the Gonzalo 
and Granger model focuses on the components of the common factor and the error 
correction process and they attribute a greater share of price discovery to the market that 
adjusts least to the price movement in the other markets. De Jong (2002) derives the 
relationship between the two approaches. Putniņš (2013) concisely reviews the latest 
development in this area, and clarifies what the ‘information share’ and the ‘component 
share’ exactly measure. Our study is focusing on the same US Treasury securities that 
traded on two very similar and competitive platforms, BrokerTec and eSpeed. We aim to 
identify which platform is more informative in the sense that prices of the platform adjust 
least to the true efficient price. So, we adopt the Gonzalo and Granger model in this paper. 
 
3. The US Treasury Market Electronic Trading Platforms and Data 
 
In the US Treasury Market the assets being traded are very simple in terms of possible 
asymmetric information about cash flows and default characteristics. The only source of 
asymmetric information in the inter-dealer segment of this market is ‘position 
information’ and perhaps information about differential trading strategies.  This market is 
inherently very liquid and so it is unlikely that prices depart from fundamentals for long 
or that trading costs differ significantly regardless of where trading takes place.  Also, 
since the market is very transparent, fragmentation is easy to facilitate in the sense that a 
reference price is available from which to benchmark bilateral transactions.  While the 
market is very homogeneous it is not perfectly so. The two main electronic trading 
platforms have slight differences in their ‘pre-trade’ transparency and their share of 
activity.   In this section, we give a brief introduction on the development of the US 
Treasury market detailing the important differences between the main platforms. 
 
The US Treasury market plays an important role in the international financial system 
because of its size, liquidity and low transaction cost.  There were more than $5 trillion 
US Treasury securities outstanding at the end of the sample period chosen for this study 
(i.e., as of August 31, 2008). Foreign and international investors held around $2.7 trillion 
of the market supply.  The first tier of the secondary US Treasury market is a dealer-
based market.  Primary dealers are the most important and key private sector players in 
the Treasury market and account for most of the overall trading volume (primary dealer 
daily average trading volume in US Treasury securities was approximately $570 billion 
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during 2007).  There were 16 primary dealers active in the Treasury market as at October 
2008.
4
 
 
Before 1999, all trading in the B2B market took place OTC (over the counter) by phone 
via bilateral voice-assisted inter-dealer negotiations. Since then most of the trading has 
migrated to fully electronic platforms (Mizrach and Neely, 2006). The ground work for 
executable platforms began when the GovPX system for recording and disseminating 
voice-brokered trades was introduced in the mid-1990s.  GovPX was the first real attempt 
to centralize prices and this vastly improved the post-trade transparency of the Treasury 
market.  The first large platform where limit-order placement and electronic trade 
execution was possible was on the eSpeed platform introduced by Cantor Fitzgerald in 
1999.  In June 2000, BrokerTec Global LLC, a rival electronic trading platform, began 
operations. BrokerTec had been formed the previous year as a joint venture of seven large 
fixed income dealers. BrokerTec was acquired in May 2003 by ICAP plc which was itself 
the outcome of a merger in 1999 between Garban plc and Intercapital plc. 
 
As the transition to electronic trading continued the eSpeed and BrokerTec platforms 
have competed for market share particularly in the ‘on-the-run’ treasuries.  While eSpeed 
captures some of the ‘off-the-run’ market this part of the market remains mostly voice 
brokered.  Mizarch and Neely (2006) estimated that BrokerTec accounted for about 61% 
of trading activity in the on-the-run treasuries and eSpeed 39%.  We can confirm that, for 
the sample period covered here, the market share of BrokerTec increased slightly in most 
maturities since 2005. We do not have access to information about who the subscribers 
are to each of the two platforms but it is well known that the larger dealers maintain a 
presence on both markets while smaller dealers often choose one or the other. 
 
Both eSpeed and BrokerTec platforms are fully automated electronic trading platforms 
where buyers are matched to sellers without human intervention. They both provide pre-
trade transparency in the form of electronic screens which display various levels of the 
orderbook. There is wide use of the transaction prices (post-trade transparency) in the 
wider market through services such as Bloomberg.  However, important subtle 
                                                 
4
 This represents a low point.  There were 20 Primary Dealers in Oct 2007, 40 in 1998 and 46 in 1988.  In 
July 2009 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced interest from 4 new applicants and there were 
signs of increased appetite among other dealers due to the increased volatility in yields and the increased 
size of the Treasury market due to the financial turmoil. 
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differences remain regarding pre-trade transparency. Pre-trade views of the orderbooks 
are disseminated differently. There is a terser (and less transparent) presentation of the 
BrokerTec orderbook.  
 
The main differences in pre-trade transparency can be traced to developments in 
September 2002, when Cantor Fitzgerald launched a product called  “Cantor Market 
Data” and soon afterwards launched a real-time data product (Cantor G3) that featured 
views of limit orders, trading stacks and last traded price for each of the five on-the-run 
UST Benchmarks.  An example of the G3 view is given in Figure 1
5
.  This view is very 
easy to interpret and reveals whether bids and asks are made up from multiple buyers and 
sellers, single or multiple substantial orders or multiple small orders.  Market participants 
can instantly see the five best prices and total size for each price on each side of the book 
and the individual order sizes for the best bid and ask.  There is no hidden quantity at the 
various levels of the book. Cantor G3 also shows the recent trend for the 10 most recent 
trades.    For the period studied, BrokerTec has hidden and displayed order volume at 
each of the limit-order prices. The choice of what amount to display is not mandated. 
When a transaction exceeds the limit-order quantity there is a chance that hidden quantity 
will be available to fill the order at the same price.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Thus, while the two platforms are broadly similar they differ in terms of hidden orders, 
how widely the orderbook is viewed and the ease with which the order-book information 
can be understood at a glance.  Both platforms allow for the possibility of ‘work-ups’.  In 
terms of clientele it is widely known in the industry that eSpeed has more of the share of 
the dealers who represent buy-side participants from the life assurance and pensions 
industry.  This has led to a slight dominance by eSpeed in the trading of treasuries at the 
longer maturity.  BrokerTec has a larger share of activity in all other maturity categories 
and this has been growing slightly over time, see Figure 2.   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
 
Data: 
  
                                                 
5
 See http://www.cantorg3.com/g3vision/launch/index.html. 
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Our data contains records of limit orderbook events from BrokerTec and eSpeed. The 
sample periods involve non-contiguous months (April, June and August) in 2002, 2004 
and 2005.  We also have all of 2003. The daily coverage runs from 8:00am to 5:30pm 
EST.  We examine the 2, 5, 10 and 30 year “on-the-run” Treasuries. Each record includes 
best ask and best bid prices at event frequency and we also have the orderbook quantities 
which allows us to ascertain the relative liquidity of the two platforms over time and by 
maturity.  Our empirical analysis concentrates on the price data.  We match records at all 
events with the prevailing prices from the two platforms at the following frequencies (5, 
10, 15 and 30 second intervals).  Tables 1 show that the average depth on BrokerTec is 
nearly twice that on eSpeed at the shorter maturities.  BrokerTec also provides the 
narrower bid-ask spreads in short and medium term maturities (2-, 5-, 10-Year) while 
eSpeed provides tighter bid-ask spreads on average at the very long-term maturity (30-
year).  Note the use of A, B and a, b to denote the best ask and best bid price of 
BrokerTec and eSpeed respectively. Similarly, S and s denotes the bid-ask spread of 
BrokerTec and eSpeed.  We adopt this notation for the remainder of the paper. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
4. Methodology  
 
To investigate the mechanics of price discovery, we use Gonzalo-Granger’s (1995) 
permanent-transitory decomposition approach. The Gonzalo-Granger approach focuses 
on the components of the common factor and the error correction process; it measures 
each market’s contribution to the common factor, where the contribution is defined to be 
a function of the markets’ error correction coefficients. The Gonzalo-Granger model 
starts from the estimation of vector error correction model which in this case will be:  
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  (1) 
 
where At, Bt are the ask and bid prices of BrokerTec, and where at, bt are the ask and bid 
prices of eSpeed and we write 4 4' .r r      Following the notation of De Jong (2002),  
the Gonzalo-Granger decomposition, implies that the permanent component is  tf   
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and   is a 4 1 vector (with elements adding up to one) that measures the contribution of 
market i  to price discovery (see also Booth, So and Tse, 1999, and Harris et al., 2002).  
 
We note that if all elements in ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b  are integrated of order one and no 
cointegrating relationships exist, then 0;  if elements in ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b  are stationary 
I(0) variables, then the matrix 
 
must be of full rank; if 
 
is of rank (0 4)r r   the 
elements in 1 1 1 1( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b    are linear combinations that are stationary. If the 
variables in ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b are I(1), these linear combinations must correspond to 
cointegrating vectors. If 
 
has a reduced rank 3,r  this means that there are r 
independent linear combinations of the 4 elements in ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b  that are stationary, 
that is: there exist r cointegrating relationships. In the case of reduced rank, we can write 
4 4' .r r     The linear combinations 1 1 1 1'( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b      present the r cointegrating 
relationships. The coefficients in α measures how the elements in ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b     
adjust to the r “equilibrium errors” 1 1 1 1'( , , , ) '.t t t tA B a b        
 
The maximum likelihood based procedure proposed by Johansen (1988) is most 
commonly used in the literature to test for the number of cointegrating relations. 
Assuming ( , , , ) 't t t tA B a b  is a vector of I(1) variables, the approach of Johansen is based 
on the estimation of the above equations by maximum likelihood, while imposing the 
restrictions '   for a given value of r. The Johansen approach involves testing 
hypothesis about the rank of the long-run matrix ,  or – equivalently – the number of 
columns in β.  For a given r, it can be shown (see, e.g. Hamilton, 1994) that the ML 
estimate of β equals the matrix containing the r eigenvectors corresponding to the r 
largest eigenvalues of a 4 4  matrix. We can use the estimated eigenvalues to test 
hypotheses about the rank of ,  for example, the so-called trace test and the maximum 
eigenvalue test. The two tests are actually likelihood ratio tests, but don’t have the usual 
Chi-squared distributions. Instead, the appropriate distributions are multivariate 
' 1 ''( , , , ) ' ( ) ( , , , ) ',t t t t t t t t tf A B a b A B a b   

   
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extensions of the Dikey-Fuller distributions. More details can be found in Johansen 
(2002). 
 
It is worth noting that in ',   the parameters α and β are not uniquely identified. The 
cointegrating vectors in β have to be normalized in some way to obtain unique 
cointegrating relationships. One interesting case is when the rank of   is three. This 
leads intuitively to a set of restriction implying that each price changes is affected by its 
own lagged spread and the price gap between the two platforms. The restrictions required 
to achieve this are as follows:  
 
1 1 0 0
' 0 0 1 1 .
1 1 1 1

 
  
 
   
 (2) 
We test that the rank of   is three and then test the above set of restrictions.  We 
examine the size and significance of the adjustment parameters under this set of 
restrictions and this reveals the response by each price attributable to cross-platform 
disequilibrium and to own-platform bid-ask spread disequilibrium. We also note that if 
'  is specified as (2), we have ,    a 4 1  vector of ones and this simplifies the 
calculation of the price discovery parameter  . 
 
5. Results 
 
In this section, we first implement some exploratory testing regarding the long-run 
equilibrium between the two trading platforms.  For instance, we investigate the long-run 
relationships between bid or ask prices on the two platforms separately. We then analyze 
the bid and ask prices on both platforms jointly using the Johansen procedure and we then 
examine where price discovery takes place. We get very different estimated magnitudes 
of adjustment to cross-platform disequilibrium when we apply the more general approach 
and this highlights a large source of error when the bid-ask spread disequilibria are 
dropped from the analysis. Nevertheless, we still find substantial support for the main 
hypothesis that eSpeed is the market that adjusts to true valuation errors and this implies 
that BrokerTec is where price discovery mainly occurs.  
 
5.1 Exploratory Tests 
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We first show the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of whether the bid and ask price levels 
and their first differences on each platform are stationary. The results for the bid price 
(and the first difference of bid price) from the BrokerTec platform is shown in Table 2 
Panel A (and Panel B for 1
st
 difference series).   The stationarity and cointegration testing 
gives the expected results.  It is clear that non-stationarity of the bid price level cannot be 
rejected.
6
  We can also reject non-stationarity for the case of the first difference of the bid 
price series. The results for the other 3 series are not shown but give similar conclusions.  
Also, we find that the bid and ask prices on each platform are cointegrated with each 
other which implies that the bid-ask spread itself is stationary in each platform.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
We can then make use of the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step procedure to estimate 
the long-run relationship between the two platforms using either the ask or bid prices to 
represent underlying value on each platform.  This involves testing for non-stationarity of 
the two series believed to be cointegrated followed by estimation of a cointegrating 
relation and an Error Correction Model (ECM). If the prices of the two platforms are 
integrated of order 1 and cointegrated, the variables have the following error-correction 
form (here we only show the case of bid prices):    
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 (3) 
        
The ECM representation allows for testing of weak exogeneity and causality.  This 
allows us to test whether disequilibrium between the two prices explains future 
movements in prices to restore equilibrium.  If the burden of adjustment is unevenly 
shared we obtain insights about which platform is a better representation of underlying 
value at any instant and which platform produces prices that are, most likely, still 
responding to recent information shocks. To examine whether there is evidence of 
cointegration between the bid price on BrokerTec and the bid price on eSpeed, we 
estimate; 0 1 ,t t tB b e      
where te  should be found to be stationary.  
 
The regression result is shown in table 3. The relationship is: 
                                                 
6
 The other results of the testing of price levels and their first difference are available from the authors on 
request. Both of the bid and ask price level of two platform are non-stationary, and their first difference are 
stationary. 
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0.0287 0.9997t t tB b e    
A joint test is performed to examine whether the constant is significantly different from 0 
and the slope coefficient is different from 1. The resulting F-test is 4.6347 with 
significance level 0.0097. Similarly, although the slope parameter is close to 1 it is 
statistically different from it.   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Testing for the stationarity of the residual { }te  is done with a standard augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test with the appropriate number of lags.
7
  The regression results (available 
from the authors on request) show clearly that the residual { }te  is stationary and the 
cointegration relation is valid.  This also implies that an ECM representation is valid.  We 
therefore proceed to the ECM regression, Eq. (3), using the residuals from the 
equilibrium regression.  
   
From table 4, we see that the estimated coefficient 2  is 0.8899 with a standard error of 
0.0179 and the coefficient of 1  is -0.1019 with a standard error of 0.0133. This reveals 
that both of the bid price series from BrokerTec and eSpeed share a long-run equilibrium. 
Moreover, the signs of the adjustment coefficients are in accord with convergence toward 
the long-run equilibrium.  Thus, in response to a positive discrepancy, 1te  >0, the bid 
price of eSpeed tends to increase while the bid price of BrokerTec tends to decrease. 
Nevertheless, the bid price of BrokerTec moves, on average, a little while the bid price of 
eSpeed moves a lot to correct for disequilibrium. The bid price adjustment of eSpeed is 
significantly larger than BrokerTec. This implies BrokerTec is the long–run anchor for 
price.  Reversing the Engle-Granger cointegrating relation does not change this result. 
                                                 
7
 We use estimates of 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for ADF, from MacKinnon 1996, with N=1, 
assuming no trend in the cointegrating relation.  For any sample size T, the estimated critical value is 
  where the following table provides the required parameters.  Our sample size is so 
large that we were able to use the  values;  
Level 
   
1% -3.434 -5.999 -29.25 
5% -2.862 -2.738 -8.36 
10% -2.567 -1.438  -4.48 
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The conclusion also remains the same if we test for evidence of cointegration between the 
ask prices on the two platforms. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
5.2 Price Discovery 
 
So far, we have examined the long-run equilibrium and adjustment to disequilibrium for 
the bid or ask prices on the two platforms separately. The main weakness associated with 
this analysis is the fact that price adjustments could be reflecting temporary bid-ask 
spread movements rather than market (mid-price) or true value movements.  To control 
for these different sources of price adjustment we need to conduct the analysis jointly.  
Thus, to test whether the equilibrating behavior within each platform is about “price 
discovery” rather than just bid-ask spread adjustments we must analyze the internal 
cointegrating relationships simultaneously.  To achieve this we now turn to the maximum 
likelihood methods proposed by Johansen (1988) (one that allows the response to bid-ask 
disequilibrium to be accounted for as part of general price adjustment). We show that this 
gives much more plausible differences in the speed of adjustment on the two platforms 
found using the simpler analysis.  
  
We already tested for non-stationarity of the various price levels and for stationarity of 
their first differences so we proceed to application of the Johansen cointegration analysis 
directly.  We use the maximum orders of lags from these test regressions in our 
application of the multivariate Johansen procedure.  We implement the rank test 
described in Section 5 and after testing for the restriction of three cointegrating vectors 
(which is accepted) we test for the normalizations on the cointegrating vectors in β that 
give rise to the within-platform adjustment and cross-platform adjustment as described 
earlier (these restrictions are also accepted). 
 
We take the 5-year/5-second intervals in April 2005 for example.  The maximum number 
of lags used in the Johansen representation of the four equation system of equations is 
picked as 5 (see table 5). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The rank test result is reported in table 6.  This reveals that the rank of   is three. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
That is, there are three cointegration relationships. Recall that we need to normalize the 
cointegrating vectors in β to obtain unique cointegrating relationships. As described 
earlier, the restriction is specified in Eq. (2). The test of this set of restrictions is accepted.  
This has a Chi-square statistic of 7.285 with a p-value 0.063. The estimated equation 
(excluding details of the short-run parameter estimates) is reproduced below as follows: 
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This reveals that bid and ask price changes on BrokerTec are mainly affected by the 
lagged BrokerTec spread disequilibria and the lagged disequilibrium between the two 
platforms but there is also a significant small effect emanating from the lagged spread in 
the other platform.  Likewise, the bid and ask price changes on eSpeed are affected by the 
lagged eSpeed spread and the lagged price gap between the two platforms.  There is only 
a small effect running from the lagged spread of the other platform.  Overall it is 
interesting to see that more of the price adjustment is related to bid-ask spread 
disequilibrium than to cross-platform disequilibrium and this highlight the need to control 
for such effects.   
 
We can conclude from the differences in the magnitude of the response to cross-platform 
disequilibrium that more price discovery takes place on the BrokerTec platform. This 
confirms the findings using transaction data but now we find that the difference between 
the two platforms is not as stark as before. Both BrokerTec and eSpeed share the long-run 
driving dynamics.  The signs of the adjustment coefficients are as expected, with prices 
on the BrokerTec platform tending to decrease in response to cross-platform 
disequilibrium and price on the eSpeed platform tending to increase in response to 
disequilibrium. The magnitude of the eSpeed adjustment to cross-platform disequilibrium 
is roughly one-third greater than that on BrokerTec. The calculated parameter of price 
discovery is ' (0.3117,0.2969,0.1733,0.2181) ',  and the share for BrokerTec is 60.9% 
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while the share for eSpeed is 39.1%. So we can conclude with more confidence than 
before that eSpeed does more of the price adjustment to bring about long-run equilibrium.  
But the difference in the magnitude of the adjustment coefficients is not as stark as 
before. 
 
The 2-, 5- and 10-year Treasury instruments have similar results to those above (available 
from the authors on request).  However, the 30-year Treasury provides a different story. 
We analyze the 30-year bond data at 30-second intervals in August 2005.  Tables 7 and 8 
report the Ljung-Box statistics and rank tests results respectively, the maximum order of 
lags is 5 and the rank is 3. 
[Insert Table 7 and 8 here] 
The result is reproduced here for convenience.  
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The result gives us an opposite story to that at the other maturities. Thus, in the case of 
the 30-year maturity, more price discovery takes place on the eSpeed platform. As before, 
both the BrokerTec and eSpeed platforms share the long-run driving dynamics.  As 
expected, price on BrokerTec tends to decrease in response to disequilibrium and the 
price of eSpeed tends to increase in response to the disequilibrium. The speed of the 
adjustment on BrokerTec is almost twice the magnitude of that on eSpeed.  This implies 
that price discovery for the long maturity Treasuries resides in the eSpeed platform and 
that adjustment to price changes occurs in the BrokerTec platform. This is further 
confirmed by the calculated parameter of price discovery 
' (0.2352,0.1458,0.2387,0.3803) ',  and the share for BrokerTec is 38.1% and the share 
for eSpeed is 61.9%. eSpeed is more attractive for the 30-year maturity in terms of 
transaction cost because it provides tighter bid-ask spreads on average (See Table 1). This 
implies a transaction cost effect on price discovery rather than a transparency effect. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 19 
 
This paper focuses on the effect of differential trading activities and pre-trade 
transparency of competing inter-dealer electronic platforms in the US Treasury Market. 
The analysis of simultaneously observed high-frequency data from these two very similar 
markets provides a unique opportunity to examine where price discovery is most 
concentrated under only mild differences in conditions. The two similarly transparent 
trading platforms differ mainly in terms of hidden limit orders and their shares of trading 
activity.   
 
The findings only become reliable when bid and ask prices from both platforms are 
estimated in a joint cointegration relation where three cointegrating relations are imposed 
and a particular set of cointegrating relations imposed.  The three equilibrium relations 
reflect long-run levels of the bid-ask spreads (one for each platform) and an equilibrium 
value of the Treasury instrument being traded - around which prices on the two platforms 
fluctuate.  Overall the analysis suggests that more price discovery takes place in the more 
active but less transparent market (BrokerTec for the shorter maturities). The price 
dynamics on the less transparent market represent most of the long-run driving forces of 
the entire market. Most of the adjustment to disequilibrium occurs in the more transparent 
market. The magnitude of adjustment to fundamental value is almost twice as large on the 
less transparent market.  However, the findings are reversed in the case of the longer-term 
maturity where eSpeed has a clientele-list advantage (where the clients are from the 
insurance industry and are more likely to trade longer dated Treasuries).  This implies 
that transparency alone does not provide the full explanation about the location of price 
discovery.   
 
The fact that the more active and less transparent market seems to be winning more 
market share over time is partly consistent with the propositions of Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (2000) which asks whether more transparent markets can survive in such a 
context.  However, the two platforms have continued to co-exist despite the differences in 
transparency.  This probably reflects the sheer depth of this particular market and the 
legacy of their respective histories (particularly the fixed costs that have been incurred by 
some smaller participants who are only active on one or other of the two platforms and 
not both and for whom a change would be expensive and the benefits only marginal).   
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Despite the movements in market shares it seems that the two platforms will continue to 
co-exist into the foreseeable future.  Some of the largest participants seem to be willing to 
stay engaged in both markets for reasons that go beyond the small cost advantages they 
could generated by concentrating their activities on just one.  The advantages for these 
large players seem to be enough to warrant continuation of the current equilibrium in 
market structure.  The most likely benefit is the insurance that all participants obtain from 
having a back-up venue to facilitate execution of transactions if there is a market ‘outage’ 
in one platform (such as during the 9/11 atrocity). This benefit might be part of the 
explanation as to why the severe outcome forwarded by Bloomfield and O’Hara has not 
materialized.  
 
Clearly, it is interesting that neither platform has chosen to differentiate itself in a major 
way in term of transparency which suggests that they are aware of the damage that such a 
unilateral change can bring to their market share.  This also serves as a reminder for 
market regulators that dual platforms are likely to remain opposed to transparency 
changes unless all platforms are forced to move by a similar amount in this direction 
simultaneously.  
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Figure 1. The Cantor G3 view of the US Treasury Market 
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 shows that participants prefer to trade 2-, 5- and 10-year Treasury instruments 
on BrokerTec and to trade the 30-year treasury on eSpeed.  Over the three periods in 
2005 there is some slight evidence that eSpeed was increasing its share of activity 
somewhat. 
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Table 1.  Summary statistics for the US treasuries 
Panel A  
2_Year  5_Year 
April June August April June August 
AQ 
134.27 156.021 240.72 39.35 39.196 56.870 
(0.341) (0.981) (0.760) (0.000) (0.174) (0.398) 
BQ 
152.87 173.781 237.17 38.614 38.537 57.013 
(0.102) 90.583) (0.209) (0.199) (0.889) (0.729) 
aQ 
89.267 99.246 189.99 31.597 32.851 50.983 
(0.983) (0.610) (0.464) (0.222) (0.890) (0.851) 
bQ 
91.604 101.341 181.96 29.901 31.448 49.305 
(0.656) (0.111) (0.462) (0.719) (0.851) (0.287) 
S 
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.008 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) 
s 
0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
 Panel B 
10_Year 30_Year 
April June August April June August 
AQ 
39.316 37.300 51.968 5.815 5.166 6.233 
(0.402) (0.512) (0.460) (0.035) (0.012) (0.207) 
BQ 
40.464 37.306 50.748 5.830 5.156 6.182 
(0.103) (0.053) (0.114) (0.275) (0.366) (0.386) 
aQ 
29.501 30.973 45.268 5.114 4.417 5.458 
(0.226) (0.639) (0.698) (0.070) (0.236) (0.178) 
bQ 
30.673 30.229 44.4 5.215 4.336 5.442 
(0.284) (0.991) (0.574) (0.337) (0.054) (0.717) 
S 
0.017 0.017 0.016 0.038 0.033 0.033 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.153) (0.032) (0.024) 
s 
0.018 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.031 0.030 
(0.008) (0.071) (0.007) (0.033) (0.038) (0.025) 
Note: We use AQ (aQ) to denote the quantity at the best ask price of BrokerTec (eSpeed). BQ 
(bQ) is the quantity at the best bid price of BrokerTec (eSpeed). S (s) is bid-ask spread of 
BrokerTec (eSpeed). The number in each entry is the average over 2002 to 2005, and the numbers 
in brackets are standard deviations. 
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Table 2. ADF test results for bid price and 1st difference of bid price on BrokerTec 
Panel A: Regression Results, ADF Test for Stationarity of Bid Price (B) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistics  
Constant 
0.0312 
(0.0165) 
1.8915  
ΔB (Lag1) 
-0.0348 
(0.0068) 
-5.1492  
… … …  
ΔB (Lag6) 
0.0153 
(0.0064) 
2.3761  
B  (Lag1) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-1.9396  
 
Ljung-Box Q-Statistics 
Lags LB-Stat Signif 
Usable Observations 21459 Q(1-0) 0.0085 0.9267 
Degrees of Freedom 21451 Q(2-0) 0.0159 0.9920 
2R  0.0031 Q(3-0) 0.1352 0.9873 
2
R  
0.0025 Q(4-0) 0.2135 0.9947 
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0007 Q(5-0) 0.2458 0.9985 
Std Error of Depend Variable 0.0489 Q(6-0) 0.2460 0.9997 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0013 Q(7-0) 0.3533 0.9998 
 
Panel B: Regression Results, ADF Test for Stationarity of Change in Bid Price (ΔB) 
Variable   Coefficient           t- Statistics  
Constant 
-0.0010 
(0.0003) 
-2.9809   
ΔΔB (Lag1) 
0.03215 
(0.0136) 
2.3622   
… … …   
ΔΔB (Lag5) 
-0.01102 
(0.00494) 
-2.2322   
ΔB  (Lag1) 
-1.0641 
(0.0152) 
-69.857   
 
Ljung-Box Q-Statistics 
Lags LB-Stat Signif 
Usable Observations 21458 Q(1-0) 0.414 0.5201 
Degrees of Freedom 21450 Q(2-0) 0.581 0.7479 
2R  0.5214 Q(3-0) 0.642 0.8868 
2
R  
0.5213 Q(4-0) 0.644 0.9580 
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0001 Q(5-0) 1.925 0.8594 
Std Error of Depend Variable 0.0701 Q(6-0) 2.854 0.8269 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0060 Q(7-0) 2.896 0.8945 
This table contains ADF test regression results. In Panel A the dependent variable is ΔB, the first difference 
of the bid price of the BrokerTec platform while in Panel B it is the first difference of the same bid price 
series. The test parameter and t-statistic is highlighted in bold typeface.  The appropriate critical values of 
the t-statistic for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the lagged level (or lagged first 
difference in the case of Panel B) is not equal to zero is provided in footnote 6.  For the case of an 
extremely large sample, these are -2.567, -2.862 and -3.4336 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively.  It is therefore not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the bid price of BrokerTec has a 
unit root while we can easily reject the presence of a unit root in the case of the first difference of the bid 
price. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic does not reveal any significant autocorrelations among the residuals.  
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Table 3 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistics Significant 
Constant 
0.0287 
(0.0110) 
2.6227 0.0087 
B 
0.9997 
(0.0001) 
9108.3092 0.0000 
Usable Observations 37644 
Degrees of Freedom 37642 
2R  1.0000 
2
R  
0.9995 
Mean of Dependent Variable 99.778 
Std Error of Dependent Variable 1.9259 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0007 
Note that B is independent variable.  
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Table 4.1 VAR/System - Estimation by Least Squares (Dependent Variable ΔB) 
Variable   Coefficient t- Statistics p-value 
ΔB (Lag1) 
-0.0082  
(0.0129) 
-0.6393  0.5226 
ΔB (Lag2) 
-0.0059       
(0.0110) 
-0.5445 0.5860 
ΔB (Lag3) 
-0.0259  
(0.0087) 
-2.9533 0.0031 
Δb (Lag1) 
-0.0206 
(0.0115) 
-1.7856 0.0741 
Δb (Lag2) 
-0.0050 
(0.0094) 
-0.5314 0.5951 
Δb (Lag3) 
-0.0003 
 (0.0067) 
-0.0514 0.9589 
Constant 
 -0.0012 
(0.0003)      
-3.8825 0.0001 
RES(Lag1) 
 -0.1019 
(0.0133) 
-7.6385 0.0000 
    
 
F-Tests -- Dependent Variable DB  
Variable F-Statistic        Significant 
Usable Observations 23545  ΔB 3.1880 0.0226 
Degrees of Freedom 23537  Δb 1.998 0.1116 
Standard Error of Estimate 0.0477  
Sum of Squared Residuals 53.7049  
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0011  
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0479  
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0009  
 
Table 4.2VAR/System - Estimation by Least Squares (Dependent Variable Δb) 
Variable   Coefficient t- Statistics p-value 
ΔB (Lag1) 
-0.0162  
(0.0173)      
-0.9343 0.3501 
ΔB (Lag2) 
-0.0036   
(0.0148)    
-0.2493 0.8030 
ΔB (Lag3) 
-0.0207  
(0.0118)                
-1.7600 0.0784 
Δb (Lag1) 
-0.0283 
(0.0155) 
-1.8194 0.0688 
Δb (Lag2) 
-0.0158 
(0.0126) 
-1.2475 0.2121 
Δb (Lag3) 
-0.0002 
(0.0090) 
-0.0237      0.9810 
Constant 
-0.0009 
(0.0004) 
-2.3172     0.0205 
RES(Lag1) 
0.8899   
(0.0179) 
49.5420 0.0000 
    
 
F-Tests -- Dependent Variable Db  
Variable F-Statistic        Significant 
Usable Observations 23545  ΔB 1.3238      0.2646 
Degrees of Freedom 23537  Δb 1.6702      0.1710 
Standard Error of Estimate 0.0642  
Sum of Squared Residuals 97.19  
Mean of Dependent Variable -0.0011  
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0772  
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0004  
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Table 5. Ljung-Box Q-Statistics of cross correlations. 
 
Lags Ljung-Box-Stat 
Significance 
Level 
Ljung-Box-Stat 
Significance 
Level 
Q(1 to 1) 0.0309 0.8603 6.9876e-04 0.9789 
Q(1 to 2) 0.0461 0.9772 1.3853e-03  0.9993  
Q(1 to 3) 0.0565 0.9964 0.1074 0.9909 
Q(1 to 4) 0.4164 0.9811 1.3022 0.8610 
Q(1 to 5) 0.8295 0.9751 1.3783 0.9266 
Note: We provide here the L-B test results pertaining to the bid price series from the two 
platforms.  The results for the ask series are qualitatively similar. 
 
 
Table 6. Rank test results. 
 
r ˆ
i  trace  
Frac95 P-Value 
0 0.117 36511.6 63.659 0.000 
1 0.093 21431.7 42.770 0.000 
2 0.076 9580.0 25.731 0.000 
3 0.000 6.981 12.448 0.357 
Note: Frac95 is the 5% critical value of the test. 
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Table 7. Ljung-Box Q-Statistics of cross correlations. 
Lags Ljung-Box-Stat 
Significance 
Level 
Ljung-Box-Stat 
Significance 
Level 
Q(1 to 1) 4.8280e-03 0.9446 2.5419e-04 0.9872 
Q(1 to 2) 0.0158 0.9921 4.6766e-04 0.9997 
Q(1 to 3) 0.0214 0.9991 5.2999e-04 0.9999 
Q(1 to 4) 0.0214 0.9999 6.4329e-03 0.9999 
Q(1 to 5) 0.1437 0.9996 0.0367 0.9999 
Note: We provide here the L-B test results pertaining to the bid price series from the two 
platforms.  The results for the ask series are qualitatively similar. 
  
Table 8. Rank test results. 
 
r ˆ
i  trace  
Frac95 p-value 
0 0.138 8068.9 63.659 0.000 
1 0.125 4786.5 42.770 0.000 
2 0.080 1843.9 25.731 0.000 
3 0.000 9.028 12.448 0.183 
Note: Frac95 is the 5% critical value of the test. 
  
